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1. Overview 
Subsidy reforms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have concentrated on 
changing fuel prices and electricity tariffs. Conversely, food subsidy reforms have 
received less attention, reflecting the comparatively small fiscal cost of food subsidies and 
their high social sensitivity. While countries’ experiences have common characteristics, they 
differ in terms of preparation, scope of reform, and speed of adjustment. 
Successful subsidy reforms in MENA countries (and elsewhere) were in general based on 
well-prepared plans, which were part of a broader fiscal consolidation strategy, and in 
some instances were backed by public communication campaigns. Some of the countries 
that raised prices sharply saw these gains knocked out by high international oil prices and 
exchange rate depreciation. On the other hand, many MENA countries (e.g. Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia) implemented a price adjustment mechanism to bring domestic fuel prices 
up to international levels. The reforms were supplemented by some compensation, either 
through the introduction/strengthening of targeted mitigating measures such as cash transfers, 
or less effective measures such as public sector wage increases (IMF, 2014; Sdralevich et al., 
2014). 
Political economy factors present perhaps the greatest challenges. Barriers can take the 
form of resistance on the part of a small but organised group of potential losers from reform; the 
lag between the immediate loss of subsidies and the future benefit from more targeted and 
efficient social spending; and the loss of trust in the state’s ability to introduce and manage 
social safety nets while not misusing the savings. These areas of opposition can be resolved 
through suitable reform design, including building an objective case for reform; growing 
transparency and leveraging communication campaigns; forming coalitions of beneficiaries from 
reforms; and incorporating reform in a wider reform plan (IMF, 2014; Sdralevich et al., 2014). 
Some of the key lessons from case studies on countries in the MENA region include the 
following. 
 In Egypt, subsidy reforms were passed (starting from 2014) to free up extra resources 
for investment in social and human development. This was necessary since, for 
instance, energy subsidies were taking up to a fifth of public expenditure. Egypt also had 
a wide range of subsidies on electricity, water and food. However, the subsidies (apart 
from food subsidies) were regressive – i.e. mainly benefiting richer groups. Following the 
successful passing of these reforms, Egypt has moved from a system of inefficient 
universal subsidies to more targeted social safety nets – such as targeted cash transfers 
and the use of smart cards to reach the poorest communities. 
 In Jordan, expensive fuel and electricity subsidies had become unsustainable. The 
recent regional political instability – which has disrupted supply chains and created 
strains on public finances – had made the situation worse. As the subsidies became 
fiscally unsustainable, the government introduced reforms, e.g. lowering and/or totally 
removing subsidies on different fuel products. Due to strong popular opposition to the 
reforms (which had made life more expensive), the government introduced targeted 
mitigating measures that included large scale cash transfers to the poor and needy.  
 In Mauritania, high global fuel and food prices and domestic fiscal constraints had forced 
the government to pass subsidy reforms. An initial reform attempt in 2008 had failed due 
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to poor planning and lack of complementary mitigation schemes to those adversely 
affected. The follow up successful reform in 2011 improved on earlier failures and 
explicitly set up mitigation strategies. Its success also partly emanates from the 
involvement of external partners such as the IMF – which assisted in the design and 
implementation of the reforms; the World Bank and the French Development Agency – 
which helped in the restructuring of the country’s biggest public electricity company; the 
World Food Programme and UNICEF – which assisted in the design and implementation 
of social safety nets. 
 In Morocco, subsidies on wide range of items (e.g. fuel, gas, sugar, and flour) had 
stayed in place, despite their inefficiency and the considerable fiscal strain they created 
on the country’s finances. A combination of political reforms that empowered the 
government facilitated the passing of subsidy reforms by early 2010s. like other 
successful reformers, Morocco has complemented its subsidy reforms with targeted 
large-scale social programmes.  
 In Yemen, successful fuel subsidy reforms were passed in 2005. Nevertheless, overall 
expenditure on subsidies remained high because of price rises on different subsidised 
items. Lessons were taken from the 2005 reform to pass a more successful reform in 
2010 (followed by further price amendments on oil products in later years). This was 
done with the help of the IMF and World Bank. The reforms were also accompanied by 
additional efficiency enhancing measures. Furthermore, a Social Welfare Fund was 
launched to carry out conditional cash transfers. 
This rapid review looks at different types of pertinent literature – including reports issued by 
multilateral financial institutions that are usually major proponents of subsidy reforms (e.g. IMF 
and World Bank); international development agencies that are often interested in supporting the 
design and implementation of social protection schemes that will be complementary to subsidy 
reforms; relevant government agencies, as well as some academic publications.  
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the key lessons from various 
countries on subsidy reforms (e.g. fuel subsidy, electricity subsidy, food subsidy). Particularly, the 
section discusses the potential gains from successful subsidy reforms; how periods of ‘crisis’ can 
be opportune moments to carry out reforms – instead of just being periods of challenge; and why 
social protection policies are needed to mitigate the adverse effects of such reforms on the poor. 
Section 3 briefly deliberates on the key issues in subsidy reforms in the MENA region – including 
their considerable fiscal burden to governments; their inefficiencies in benefiting the poor; and 
how they create market distortions. Importantly, Section 4 presents case studies of subsidy 
reforms in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen. 
2. Key Lessons from Subsidy Reforms (Global Evidence) 
2.1 Potential Fiscal Gains from Reforms (Costs of Subsidies) 
The money spent on subsidies is usually redirected from public budgets that could have 
been used in other important areas, such as investments in education and infrastructure. 
Energy consumption subsidies, although intended to benefit the poor, are usually regressive 
because the bulk of the benefits accumulate to those with the greatest levels of consumption, i.e. 
those at the top of the income distribution. Subsidy programmes also distort energy markets by 
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promoting excessive consumption overall while shifting demand toward subsidised products and 
away from those products with pricing that properly reflect real market conditions (Inchauste and 
Victor, 2017). 
Problems linked to subsidies are widely recognised. However, the total global level of 
subsidy stays high. Consumer and producer subsidies were calculated at 0.7% of global gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2013 (Coady et al. 2015). That is because subsidies, for all their 
distortions to the function of government and energy markets, are often hugely popular politically. 
Subsidies typically start as a price stabilisation policy, usually in the form of price controls. 
Organised consumer groups around the world have credibly demonstrated that they will mobilise 
(even to the point of revolt) when the price of essential products increases to unacceptable levels 
(Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
A study on the political economy of energy subsidy reform is especially relevant today 
since the sharp decline in several energy commodity prices in recent years has generated 
an opportunity for reformers (CFR, 2015; Klevnas et al., 2015). Cheaper prices for crude oil 
and products have implied that the subsidy required to sustain price controls is much lower. 
Nevertheless, in some countries, the perpetuation of price controls set in the era of elevated 
global prices signifies that, in effect, programmes that used to create subsidies are now raising 
the local cost of energy products comparative to global markets. For commodity-exporting 
countries, lower prices have caused huge fiscal pressure on governments, and this in turn has 
created pressing needs for reform (Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
When the recipients of subsidies are large in number and widely spread among the public, 
the political difficulty is likely much tougher for policymakers to resolve. Special interest 
groups may also profit from subsidies. For instance, the broad public gained considerably from 
the subsidy programme in Indonesia. Even poor and vulnerable households, who did benefit 
comparatively less from total spending on subsidies, found that the potential gain was relatively 
large as a proportion of their incomes. Likewise, in Jordan, the wealthiest quintile obtained three 
times more in fuel subsidies on average than the poorest quintile, but the level of kerosene and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) subsidies for poorer income groups was fairly high as a ratio of 
their expenditures (Atamanov et al., 2015). In these environments, the benefits from the subsidy 
are noticeable to the broader public. The public also carries the costs since the subsidy scheme 
is financed by state budget (Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
2.2 Important Lessons 
Periods of crisis offer a window of opportunity for subsidy reforms:  
As many studies have shown, big reforms often occur during a crisis. This is because a 
crisis can dramatically increase the credibility of reformers. There are no other options if the 
government has already depleted local policy choices and is turning to outside lenders (e.g. IMF) 
for support. Crisis is typically a driving force for reform among the many cases where countries 
have quickly adopted radical reforms–like in Iran, which eliminated one of the world's biggest 
energy subsidy regimes as the government confronted fiscal crisis from the cost of trying to cover 
fast growing oil product imports (Guillaume et al., 2011; Hassanzadeh, 2012; Inchauste and 
Victor, 2017). 
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Various country studies show that political leaders frequently ignore the necessity for 
energy subsidy reform when subsidies don't create conspicuous costs. However, reforms 
are difficult to avoid when costs get out of hand, as the following examples attest:  
 In Indonesia, the government was in the run-up to the budgetary crisis in November 2014 
when it introduced a fuel price rise since the previous budget did not allow higher than 
planned spending on fuel subsidies (Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
 In Jordan, the 2012 subsidy reform was also fuelled by an unaffordable primary fiscal 
deficit, a worsening in reserves, and an external current account deficit of 12% of GDP 
(Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
 In Ghana, oil subsidies sparked severe liquidity challenges, fuelling a price deregulation 
reform in 2015–a job made politically easier by the collapse of world oil prices (Inchauste 
and Victor, 2017). 
 In the Dominican Republic, the economy was wrecked by the rising oil prices and the 
international economic crisis in 2008/2009–two exogenous incidents that popped up the 
cost of the subsidy while also reducing the country's tax base. These events have 
resulted in unsustainable fiscal costs, which have created enormous pressure on the 
government to plug its budget holes through the LPG subsidy reform (Inchauste and 
Victor, 2017). 
Major fiscal crises are usually instances during which leaders have no alternative but to 
introduce policy change. However, sudden reforms themselves can also represent shocks that 
threaten their ultimate success. In the aftermath of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's 
long-discussed reforms of energy subsidies were suddenly needed–partly because of conditions 
set by the IMF and other external lenders (Beaton and Lonto, 2010). In the midst of the crisis, 
instead of following the planned phase-out subsidy strategy, the government announced sudden 
price increases of 25 % for kerosene, 60 % for diesel fuel and 71 % for gasoline (IMF, 2013). 
Violent protests and insurgency against the Suharto regime, which had been in power since the 
1960s, followed (Rosjo, 2014). These political pressures compelled Suharto to withdraw from 
office next year, in 1998, and taught all Indonesian leaders who followed him about the dangers 
of shocks – in the form of energy subsidies reforms (Inchauste and Victor, 2017). 
Improvements in social protection are critical to the success of reforms:  
Governments have generally achieved overall savings, when shifting spending from 
broad-based consumer support programmes to better-targeted social programmes. 
Expectedly, the size of the savings depends on the degree of reform. For instance, the 2002 
reforms in Indonesia was estimated to have saved around 2.5% of GDP, while the compensation 
package was reported to have cost only around 0.2% of GDP (Inchauste and Victor, 2017:11). 
Cost savings were, at least initially, smaller–in cases where governments were concerned 
about political survival. For example, the 2013 subsidy cuts in Indonesia were estimated to 
have saved around 0.4 % of GDP, while the compensation package reportedly cost around 0.3 
% of GDP, yielding a net savings of 0.1 % of GDP (Inchauste and Victor, 2017: 11). 
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Building credibility is vital when strong interest groups resist subsidy reform: 
It is more difficult for governments to reform subsidies–if these schemes bring more 
benefits to well-organised interest groups (or evidently to an electorate). This is because 
reform entails costs (or fears of costs) that powerful interest groups will not accept. For instance, 
in Bolivia, President Morales had to cancel his move to remove fuel subsidies at the beginning of 
2011, when pervasive unrest and the threat of a national transport strike followed. The outcome 
was a policy change that resulted in an increase (rather than a decrease) in subsidy expenditure 
from 0.9% of GDP in 2010 to 2% of GDP in 2014. Occasionally reformers find 'credible' ways to 
make shifts in the way benefits are delivered. In Ghana, for example, the government negotiated 
a trigger point with the local commercial vehicle transport union to avoid intermittent, 
unwarranted rises in transport fares in 2012. It was agreed that transport fares would rise by one-
third of the fuel price rise–but only if the year's cumulative fuel prices surpassed 10% (Inchauste 
and Victor, 2017:12). 
3. Key Issues in Subsidy Reforms in the MENA Region 
Subsidies play a particular role in the MENA region, where generalised price subsidies 
have been part of the 'social contract' for decades. They often take the place of cash 
transfers and other types of direct income assistance that are not extensively used. Social safety 
nets (with the exception of subsidies) are not very well developed and are usually short of funds, 
comprising on average less than 0.7% of GDP in public spending (Sdralevich et al., 2014: 1).  
As a result, MENA governments tend to deal with shocks by expanding subsidies or 
raising public sector employment and wages – as they have done in response to the 
increased social demands that have followed the wave of political transitions across the region. 
In several oil-exporting countries, low energy prices are seen as reflecting the low cost of 
extraction, which is not viewed as cost to the budget. In some countries, the sense of entitlement 
is firmly rooted, and low energy prices are seen as a right to citizenship and a key component of 
legitimacy, substituting for political participation (Sdralevich et al., 2014; IMF, 2014).  
The cost of subsidies in the MENA region is substantial. Relative to other regions, subsidies 
expenditure (estimated on the basis of the gap between international and domestic prices) is on 
average much higher. This burden is more and more difficult to bear. Energy subsidies continue 
to account for the largest part of the overall expenditure on subsidies. Pre-tax energy subsidies 
in 2011 were estimated at USD 236.5 billion, equivalent to 48 % of global subsidies (or 8.6 % of 
regional GDP). They amounted to USD 204 billion (or 8.4% of GDP) for oil exporters and USD 
33 billion (6.3% of GDP) for oil importers. In 2012, the available figures for diesel and gasoline 
showed that pre-tax subsidies for these products, which alone account for about half of MENA's 
total energy subsidies, represented 3.8% of regional GDP. Food subsidies are also common, 
albeit much less costly, at around USD 22 billion or 0.7% of GDP in 2011 (Sdralevich et al., 
2014: 1).  
Subsidies are often intended to attain several objectives at once. In the context of 
underdeveloped social safety nets, MENA governments rely overly on generalised subsidies to 
support real incomes and combat poverty via affordable prices on commonly consumed 
products, and to protect the population from shocks caused by large volatility in commodity 
prices and exchange rates, especially in oil-importing countries. In oil-producing countries, 
subsidies are also a tool for spreading the wealth of natural resources among the population. In 
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several MENA countries, governments are helping certain industries and promoting employment 
in the private sector–through producer subsidies, such as lower market prices for energy inputs 
(IMF, 2014).   
Subsidies are often ineffective and biased against the poor. Broad price subsidies (the most 
common form in the MENA region) are neither well-targeted nor cost-effective as a means of 
social protection. Although they may reach the poor to some degree, they most often benefit the 
better-off, who consume more of the subsidised goods, especially energy products. In 2008, for 
example, the poorest 40% of the population in Egypt obtained only 3% of gas subsidies 
(Sdralevich et al., 2014: 1).  
In addition, subsidies (especially for energy products) introduce welfare costs by 
distorting relative economic prices, which facilitates the over-consumption and 
misallocation of resources. This, in turn, decreases exportable resources and therefore lowers 
the accumulation of wealth for energy-exporting countries, eroding the current account of 
energy-importing countries. Furthermore, overconsumption contributes to adverse effects of 
traffic congestion, health and the environment, and inefficient specialization of domestic 
production, often in less labour-intensive and energy-intensive sectors. Subsidies also 
discourage investment in the energy sector and facilitate smuggling and black-market activity, 
which may lead to a scarcity of subsidised products. Importantly, subsidies are damaging to 
growth. While they can be used to provide short-term support to the productive sector, long-term 
subsidies have a negative effect on growth potential via price distortions, under-investment in 
labour-intensive and energy-efficient sectors, crowding out productive expenditure on human 
and physical capital, and increasing inequalities linked to inefficient support for the poor 
(Sdralevich et al., 2014). 
4. Case Studies on Subsidy Reforms in the MENA Region  
4.1 Egypt 
Gains from Reform 
 Following Egypt's reforms on fossil fuel subsidies, more budget was available for 
social spending (as the cost of subsidies decreased from around 7.0% of national 
budget in 2013/14 to 3.0% of the budget in 2015/16 and 2.7% of the budget for 2016/17). 
It was noted that price reforms accounted for about one-third of the decrease in subsidies 
costs between 2014 and 2016 (World Bank, 2017a). 
 Fiscal savings from energy subsidies reforms have been rerouted to social 
spending in areas such as health and education. Supported by the World Bank's 
technical assistance, the social programs have been significantly reformed to mitigate the 
impact of the reforms (World Bank, 2017a). 
Description of Subsidies and Reforms 
In Egypt's state budget, energy subsidies accounted for up to 20% of public expenditure 
and skewed policy choices in a number of other key areas (e.g. health and education 
investment). Energy subsidies have also altered the market and contributed to the expansion of 
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energy-intensive industries, which has further worsened pollution (The Egypt Network for 
Integrated Development, 2012; Jawad et al., 2018).  
The recent reform of energy subsidies in Egypt began in July 2014 and included an 
incremental elimination of subsidies over a period of 5 years (even if some modest cuts in 
subsidies have been made in the past). Expenditure on food and energy subsidies and social 
protection declined from 39% of public expenditure in 2014/2015 to 28.6% in 2015/2016 (Central 
Bank of Egypt 2016), with fuel prices rising by almost 70% and natural gas prices rising by 175%. 
Electricity tariffs were expected to double within five years (Ghanem, 2014; Jawad et al., 2018).  
Food subsidies covered a certain number of basic commodities (sugar, oil, rice, tea) and 
Baladi bread (accounting for over 70% of the cost of food subsidies) through a ‘household 
ration card’. In the meantime, fuel, gas, water and electricity subsidies represent more than 
63% of total public spending on subsidies (Central Bank of Egypt, 2016; Jawad et al., 2018).  
Energy subsidies are characteristically regressive in Egypt, generally benefiting middle- 
and higher-income groups with access to infrastructure and cars. Besides food subsidies, 
the elements of social policy are usually regressive in favour of middle-and higher-income 
groups, particularly those in urban areas. Energy subsidies do not reach the residents of urban 
slums. In fiscal year 2014/2015, expenditure on food and energy subsidies accounted for 35% of 
total public expenditure (Central Bank of Egypt, 2016; Jawad et al., 2018).    
In 2014, the government embarked on a sequence of radical policy changes (i.e. with the 
advent of President Al Sisi), questioning the pre-existing social compact and moving from 
universal to targeted social policies. The reforms include the phase-out of energy subsidies 
and enhanced targeting mechanisms for food subsidies and cash transfers. Egypt has also 
moved to a flexible exchange rate regime following a series of sharp devaluations of the 
Egyptian Pound and the inability to keep adequate foreign reserves (Jawad et al., 2018).  
Social Programmes to Ease the Adverse Effects of Reforms 
Al Sisi's government is substantially cutting energy subsidies and moving from universal in-kind 
subsidies to targeted cash transfers. Nevertheless, more serious reforms and improved 
targeting have been continually postponed for political reasons (Jawad et al., 2018). 
A new smart card system was implemented with a presidential decree in March 2015. 
Besides the subsidised commodity basket, the new card includes a quota of five loaves per day 
per person. In an initiative aimed at those in need, only those who obtain Baladi bread and 
receive equivalent points on their cards are given access to subsidised food products. The shift 
to smartcards has culminated in a decline in recipients from 16 million to 11 million. The 
Government has signed a USD400 million loan with the World Bank to introduce new food 
subsidies and cash transfer programmes–until subsidies reform savings are made and the 
implementation of the new programmes become financially sustainable (Jawad et al., 2018). 
Half of the savings (EGP 51 billion or USD3.3 billion) are assigned to the reform and expansion 
of social safety nets. The Ministry of Social Solidarity launched two targeted cash transfer 
programmes in April 2015: Takaful and Karama. Takaful (solidarity) is a conditional cash transfer 
programme offering financial support to low-income families with school-aged children. The 
second programme, Karama (Dignity), offers income support to elderly people and people with 
disabilities that prevent them from working (Jawad et al., 2018). In 2015, the Takaful and Karama 
programmes benefited 1.5 million poor families (about 5.5 million people) (World Bank 2015).   
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The government rationalises the reforms to the public – stating that they are needed to prevent a 
severe macroeconomic crisis (Ghanem 2014). Simultaneously, the government adopts an 
argument focused on the value of ‘sacrifice’ to justify ongoing reforms (Adly, 2014; Jawad et al., 
2018). 
Lessons from Key Success Factors 
The current administration has implemented subsidies reforms and at the same time seeks to 
address poverty (using the financial gains from the elimination of subsidies). Policies emerging 
under this administration target the household rather than the individual as a means of 
breaking the cycles of poverty. The Takaful and Karama programmes have been popular as they 
seek to empower the household by integrating cash transfer and engaging in human 
development opportunities (Jawad et al., 2018). 
The phasing-out of energy subsidies is expected to correct market distortions and lead to 
job-rich growth in the medium and longer term, i.e. by reorienting Egypt's comparative 
advantage to labour-intensive industries. In the short term, however, the restructuring of 
energy subsidies (together with the floating of Egyptian Pound and the subsequent inflation) 
have marginally raised the cost of energy-intensive industries (IMF, 2017).   
 
4.2 Jordan1  
Gains from Reform 
 A simulation of the gains from the subsidy reforms in Jordan by Atamanov et al. (2017) 
demonstrated that the elimination of subsidies for petroleum products would result 
in an increase in government revenues of JD 389 million per year. Well over 70 % of 
the increased revenue comes from higher LPG prices and 20 % comes from petrol. They 
also estimated that the government saves JD 473 million from the complete elimination 
of electricity subsidies. 
 Because the subsidies were pro-rich in nature, with their elimination, richer 
households  contributed more in proportion to increased revenues: the poorest quintile 
(poorest 20% of households) accounted for only an estimated 11 % of the revenue 
increase relative to 35 % for the top quintile (richest 20% of households) (Atamanov et 
al., 2017). 
 The cost of the cash transfer program introduced by the Government was approximately 
JD 320 million per year. Araar et al. (2013) estimated that the cash transfer program 
overcompensated the majority (almost 70%) of Jordanian households. Furthermore, 
Atamanov et al. (2017) estimated that only JD 206 million were required to have a pre-
reform poverty rate if transfers were universal. If transfers are fully targeted to the bottom 
                                                   
1 Jordan has very recently graduated from the Lower Middle-Income Countries (LMIC) group since its current 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita exceeds the threshold of 3,995 (see World Bank, 2020). However, it still 
sits just above the LMIC threshold with a per capita income of around USD 4200 as of 2018 (World Bank, 2019). 
10 
 
quintile, only JD 41 million would be required to bring poverty to its pre-reform level 
(Atamanov et al., 2017). 
Description of Subsidies and Reforms 
Like other MENA countries, Jordan has historically provided subsidies for consumables such as 
fuel, electricity, gas and food. The Government of Jordan has safeguarded its citizens from 
varying global commodity and food prices, beginning with subsidies for wheat and sugar 
(Atamanov et al., 2015; Jawad et al., 2018).   
However, in the early 1990s, liberalization policies and subsidy reforms eliminated most of 
the food subsidies except the one for wheat. Government efforts to remove wheat subsidies 
in 1996 led to a dramatic increase in bread prices and to social discontent and 'bread riots.' As a 
consequence, the reforms have been scaled back and supplemented by cash transfers to the 
poorest households to make up for higher bread prices. Continuation of subsidies for wheat, 
water and other commodities has led to sharp rises in government expenditure due to global 
market price spikes. In fact, in 2005, the government spent as much as JD 600 million (USD 846 
million, current prices) on food and oil subsidies, or about 17 % of its total spending (Atamanov 
et al., 2015).  
Despite efforts at enforcing further subsidy reforms since 2005, recent regional instability has 
had a substantial impact on energy prices and disrupted the supply of natural gas from Egypt. 
This has led to the use of expensive imported oil products to generate electricity. In order to 
prevent social and political unrest following the 2012 uprisings, the government protected 
consumers from soaring electricity costs, which led to an accumulated debt to the National 
Electric Power Company (Jawad et al., 2018). In 2012, subsidies for petroleum products alone 
made up for almost 9 % of government expenditure and up to 2.8 % of GDP in order to prevent 
social and political unrest following the 2012 uprisings, the government protected consumers 
from soaring electricity costs, which led to an accumulated debt to the National Electric Power 
Company (Jawad et al., 2018). In 2012, subsidies for petroleum products alone constituted 
almost 9 % of government expenditure and up to 2.8 % of GDP (Atamanov et al., 2015).  
The sudden fiscal burden of subsidies (i.e. in the period since regional instability) proved 
untenable, and in November 2012, the government either lowered or completely removed 
subsidies for different categories of fuel. At the same time, to make up for vulnerable 
demographics, the government launched a large-scale cash transfer scheme for households with 
incomes below JD 10,000 (USD 14,000, current prices) per year. Despite the success of the 
elimination of these subsidies, the government is struggling to gain political support for the 
elimination of additional electricity subsidies, which are proving to be even more burdensome 
than fuel subsidies (Atamanov et al., 2015). 
Subsidies in Jordan are inefficient and principally benefit the most affluent sections of 
society, who are the highest consumers of fuel and electricity. According to the 2010 Household 
Expenditures and Income Survey, the richest quintile in Jordan spends seven times more than 
the poorest quintile on subsidised petroleum products. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
further reforms has been met with resistance and remains to be a politically sensitive issue 
(Jawad et al., 2018). 
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Social Programmes to Ease the Adverse Effects of Reforms 
Jordan offers a wide range of assistance programmes, including cash transfer schemes, 
tax exemptions and social services. For example, cash transfers to families are made below a 
certain income threshold if oil prices are above USD 100 (IMF, 2014). All in all, Jordan is 
regarded to have one of the strongest social protection programmes in the MENA region 
(Jawad et al., 2018). 
Lessons from Key Success Factors 
Jordan's reform experience shows that the poor and vulnerable can be better targeted (at 
a lower fiscal cost) through targeted programmes such as cash transfers–rather than 
inefficient subsidies that generally favour the better-off sections of society unfairly. For 
example, before the 2012 reform, energy subsidies received by Jordan's richest quintile were 
about 20 percentage points higher than those obtained by the poorest quintile, according to a 
2008 household survey. The spillage of subsidies to rich households was most visible in the case 
of gasoline and diesel subsidies, where the richest quintile received more than six times more in 
the case of gasoline subsidies (and twelve times more in the case of diesel subsidies) than the 
poorest quintile (IMF, 2014). Additionally, IMF staff simulations for Jordan in 2011 showed that 
the gradual removal of price subsidies for energy products, bread and water, and the substitution 
by a well-targeted cash transfer system, could enhance the welfare of the poorest 40% of the 
population–while generating 5 % of GDP fiscal savings (IMF, 2014). 
However, Jordan's experience also shows the political challenges and resistance to 
subsidy reforms. It has been contended that the (overall) trend in Jordan has been a slow but 
steady weakening of social protection policies in recent years–even though some government 
policies have reinforced some aspects of social protection (Achcar et al. 2017). Retrenchment of 
the state in providing sufficient services and social security has led to protests and public 
unease. In 2016, a record number of public protests were registered across Jordan in reaction to 
unemployment and the reduction of subsidies (World Bank, 2017b). 
 
4.3 Mauritania 
Gains from Reform 
 The Government of Mauritania implemented an IMF-supported subsidy reform, along 
with wage bill containment. This enabled the government to realise the desired fiscal 
adjustment (i.e. deficit reduction/fiscal saving) objective (Clements et al., 2013; IMF, 
2014). 
 The adjustment strategy was intended to free up resources while still enabling 
much-needed greater social and infrastructure spending (Clements et al., 2013). The 
reform included mitigation measures as an explicit element of the energy subsidies 
reform programme. The financing of mitigation measures from the reform/price-savings 
(e.g. an increase in diesel prices by more than 20% over a five-month period in 2012) 
enabled to pacify public opposition to the reform (IMF, 2014). 
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Description of Subsidies and Reforms 
The reform of energy subsidies in Mauritania was motivated by fiscal constraints (i.e. 
increasing government spending) as well as an increase in international fuel and food 
prices. The discovery of oil in 2006 contributed to large increases in public spending, in 
particular the wage bill (through wage consolidation) and subsidies. When, contrary to 
predictions, the discovery of oil turned out to be very small, it became evident that their funding 
was not viable, given Mauritania's reliance on unreliable mining revenues. The large increase in 
world fuel and food prices in 2008 and 2011 greatly raised fiscal strains. As a result, the subsidy 
reform (along with wage bill reduction), became the centrepiece of the government's fiscal 
transition policy (supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme of IMF). The 
adjustment plan was designed to unlock funds while still encouraging the much-needed higher 
social and infrastructure spending in the country (Moers, 2013).  
Starting in 2011, the Government made progress on a successful subsidy reform 
supported by the IMF's ECF programme. In May 2012, the Government introduced a new 
gasoline pricing model, negotiated with the oil distribution companies, adopting a simpler cost 
structure. The legislation was met with relatively limited criticism, despite an increase in price of 
more than 20% since January 2011. On the contrary, an earlier attempt at energy subsidy 
reform in 2008 was unsuccessful. The fuel price freeze at the beginning of 2008 resulted in 
huge losses for (all private) energy distribution companies. At the end of June 2008, the 
government raised the price of petroleum products by 17.5 % to 20 %. No public communication 
strategy has been introduced or particular mitigation measures have been adopted in the context 
of this fuel subsidy reform episode. Yet, unlike in the 2008 episode, the implementation of 
mitigation measures in the 2011 reform was an explicit element of the energy subsidies 
reform strategy. The technical assistance provided by the IMF was part of the policy discussion. 
Despite considerable rises in international fuel prices, the comprehensive application of the new 
streamlined automatic fuel price formula on a biweekly basis helped to bring domestic fuel prices 
up to international level by June 2012, which was a significant achievement (Moers, 2013).  
High international prices have also exacerbated the cost of subsidies to the electricity 
sector. SOMELEC, the public electricity company that generates nearly all of Mauritania's 
electricity, has suffered major losses as a result of the rise in international fuel prices. Two-thirds 
of the electricity consumed in the country is produced by thermal plants, divided equally between 
diesel and fuel oil. Regardless of higher global prices, electricity tariffs have not been amended 
upwards in recent years. Residential and commercial tariffs are one of the lowest in the region 
and are calculated at more than 30% below cost recovery prices. A restructuring plan was laid 
out with the support of the World Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD). A tariff 
study, undertaken by an international firm, was finalised in 2012 and culminated in 
electricity rates being increased, especially those paid by big consumers (Moers, 2013).  
Social Programmes to Ease the Adverse Effects of Reforms 
In 2011, the Mauritanian authorities implemented emergency relief initiatives to reduce the 
impact on the poor of higher global fuel prices and a drought, which led to a food 
emergency. Unlike the 2008 emergency plan, the new package consisted mostly reversible 
initiatives (e.g., it did not include a raise in the wages of civil servants). It was worth about UM40 
billion (3.4% of GDP) and was the biggest (in share of GDP) among the region's oil importers. It 
was therefore an enhancement over earlier measures, and some social response by the 
government was clearly needed (Moers, 2013).  
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Nevertheless, the government contemplates replacing this transitory programme with 
permanent well-targeted social safety nets. With the support of the World Food 
Programme, a start has been made with a cash transfer programme. This programme, 
which was quickly put in place, targets 10,000 vulnerable households in Nouakchott (capital city) 
that were identified via a recent poverty survey. The agenda of expanding such well-targeted 
cash transfer schemes should benefit from the expansion of the vulnerability and poverty survey 
to offer national coverage, as most of the poor reside in rural areas. A broader social 
protection strategy formulated with UNICEF will also further enhance the coverage of the 
social protection system and better protect the poor and vulnerable. The authorities are 
therefore planning, with the assistance of technical and financial partners, to strengthen 
programmes such as free school cafeterias, food-for-work and support for pregnant women. In 
addition, recognizing the adverse effects of drought on food security, a national food security 
strategy for the period 2015 to 2030 and a related national investment plan have been 
established (Moers, 2013). 
Lessons from Key Success Factors 
Depoliticizing fuel price reforms as much as possible will help pass initial price increases. 
The automatic introduction of Mauritania's diesel-price formula has been very successful at 
limiting the coverage of subsidies. Putting a cap on any single price increase would ensure that 
large international price swings do not lead to excessive retail price instability, which could 
weaken political support for the automatic fuel price formula. At the same time, such a price 
smoothing would still enable domestic prices to keep up with the trend in global prices (Moers, 
2013). 
Mitigating social policies will help to offset the increase in energy prices and their effect 
on the vulnerable, but they should be well-targeted. Mauritania's recent cash-transfer 
programmes, developed with the help of the World Food Programme, appear promising in this 
respect. On the other hand, the earlier emergency relief programmes were less well-targeted and 
not as effective. In addition, care should be taken to ensure that temporary emergency 
programmes do not become permanent entitlements, draining fiscal resources. To date, the lack 
of a fully-fledged communication campaign has not been a barrier to reforms in Mauritania. 
Nevertheless, the authorities are well advised to support the reform of the energy subsidies 
through an explicit communication campaign that explains its benefits to the population. 
Transparent reporting on the use of released budget resources should also improve public 
confidence in the results of the reform (Moers, 2013). 
The linkages between the reform of fuel and electricity subsidies must be explicitly 
recognised and addressed. If the highly subsidised electricity sector uses large amounts of 
fuel, as in Mauritania, the increase in fuel prices may add to the difficulties in the electricity 
sector. In the case of public electricity utility companies, the reform should also be followed by 
clarity of their financial relationship with the government (Moers, 2013). 
The involvement of donor partners specializing in other areas (e.g. social sectors) may 
increase the chances of success of the reforms. In the case of Mauritania, the role of the 
World Food Programme and UNICEF in the development of social mitigation strategies was 
obviously useful. The study on the restructuring of the electricity sector and SOMELEC, 
supported by the World Bank and AFD, was key to tackling electricity subsidies (Moers, 2013). 
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4.4 Morocco 
Gains from Reform 
 The government made substantial savings from the subsidy reforms in the early 
2010s, as the budget for subsidies in 2014 fell from 48.8 billion Dirham to 25 billion 
Dirham (about USD 5 billion to USD 2.6 billion, current prices). This figure was estimated 
to have further decreased by the end of 2015–as fuel products are now fully regulated by 
market prices and no longer subsidised (Jawad et al., 2018). 
 Reforms at the beginning of the 2010s have been very effective in reducing the 
budget deficit while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable sections of 
the population via targeted social programs. Subsidies were first removed on those 
products that were more pro-rich (e.g. gasoline) while the reform of products that would 
affect the poor the most (e.g. LPG) was delayed (World Bank, 2017c). 
 Morocco has also proven to be an effective example of how frequent and gradual 
price changes help gain acceptance of consumers. That is, consumers get used to 
domestic price fluctuations – mirroring movements in world fuel prices and 
exchange rates. The country's experience also demonstrates that clear communication 
regarding these price movements can help guarantee that the pricing reform is sustained 
(World Bank, 2017c). 
Description of Subsidies and Reforms 
Morocco's system of subsidies has been a key part of the Moroccan social protection 
system for decades. The aim was to safeguard the purchasing power of the population in terms 
of food and fuel products (e.g. sugar, flour, butane gas and various types of fuel). Subsidies had 
become costly as their budget increased from 4.89 billion Dirham (about USD 500 million, 
current prices) or 1% of GDP in 2003 to 48.8 billion Dirham (about USD 5 billion, current prices) 
in 2011, hitting 6.1 % of GDP (Chen et al., 2014). Since the beginning of the 2000s, as food 
prices have risen globally, the Moroccan subsidies system has been criticised for its 
increasingly high costs representing large percentages of state budgets; and failing to address 
social inequities, as it has profited the middle classes and high-income groups to a great extent 
(besides supply chain businesses) instead of the poor and vulnerable population (Jawad et al., 
2018).     
As fuel products constituted the biggest part of the budget for subsidies, the newly 
elected government of 2011 manged to raise the price of liquid fuel in 2012 – after many 
years of hesitancy. In addition, prices of such products were indexed to global market prices 
from 2013 onwards. In a number of strategic notes, as well as co-hosted conferences and study 
visits with Moroccan governments, the World Bank has advised that the system of subsidies 
should be phased out and replaced by better-targeted programmes for the poor (Jawad et al., 
2018).   
Social Programmes to Ease the Adverse Effects of Reforms 
Morocco has launched a number of large-scale, targeted social assistance programmes aimed at 
alleviating poverty and the negative effects of subsidies reforms. For example, the National 
Initiative for Human Development sets a geographical target for poverty and social exclusion. In 
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2013 alone, the National Human Development Initiative carried out 4583 projects and 1644 
activities, i.e. 6227 interventions, with an expenditure of more than 3.9 billion Dirham (about USD 
405 million, current prices). The total number of benefactors crossed 1.2 million (Jawad et al., 
2018). 
Lessons from Key Success Factors 
The reform of the subsidies system was examined by Chen et al. (2014), who articulated the 
political economy model in Morocco and how various factors helped decision-makers to 
successfully implement the subsidies reforms:  
 The public have multiplied their pressure on the government to widen the inclusiveness 
of the political economy system, together with increasing demand for accountability, 
transparency and economic opportunities. 
 An incremental shift in executive power (i.e. away from King Mohamed VI to the Prime 
Minister) culminated in the 2011 constitutional reform, where, for instance, many senior 
official appointments have been moved from the monarchy to the head of government. 
 The constitutional reforms introduced in Morocco in 2011 and their subsequent 
implementation have changed the old alliances between 'privileged businessmen' and 
the government. These factors have made it hard to reform subsidies in the past.  
 
Therefore, the change in the old Moroccan political structure (i.e. following the constitutional 
reform) has made it easy to successfully pass subsidy reforms. 
 
4.5 Yemen 
Gains from Reform 
 In their simulation of subsidy reforms in Yemen, Breisinger and Ecker (2012) noted that 
the government can gain a significant saving from the removal of subsidies. They 
estimated that the removal of subsidies at once could decrease the fiscal space from 6.9 
% of GDP in 2009 to 3.5 % in 2011, which generates a surplus of 215 billion YER. They 
noted that the overall savings from an incremental or gradual reform are smaller (e.g. 130 
billion YER from 2011 through 2013) than from an accelerated reform (e.g. one-time 
removal of subsidies). 
 Breisinger and Ecker (2012) also showed that a rapid (e.g. one-time) phasing-out of 
fuel subsidies in Yemen leads to an initial drop in growth and a sharper increase in 
poverty, while gradual reductions ease the effects of growth and poverty. Slow 
phase-out is thus preferable from the point of view of growth and poverty 
reduction. Growth shocks (i.e. in a gradual reform) are less pronounced, especially in 
the agricultural sector, and overall household income losses are about 20% lower – 
compared to an accelerated reform. Nevertheless, slow reform comes at higher fiscal 
costs, since subsidies need to be financed effectively over a period of several 
years. 
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Description of Subsidies and Reforms 
Yemen has implemented a number of measures to reduce fuel subsidies since the 1990s. 
The scale of these subsidies has varied over time, mirroring changes in international fuel prices, 
consumption volumes, exchange rates and domestic prices. Yemen's primary objective in the 
subsidy reform was to enhance its fiscal position–while paying due attention to social 
considerations. Despite these reforms, the budget subsidy bill remained big at around 10 % of 
GDP in 2012 (up 14 % of GDP in 2008). This level surpasses the total spending on infrastructure 
and social services (Ostojic, 2013). 
The most essential subsidy reform, initiated in 2005, was aimed at progressively adjusting 
domestic prices over the medium term. This reform was based on World Bank and IMF policy 
advice, which highlighted the need to maintain fiscal sustainability in the face of shrinking oil 
reserves. As a consequence, the government increased domestic prices by 130% on average in 
July 2005. This increase in price led to mass protests, and the government responded by 
overturning it in part. However, the net price adjustment remained substantial at 71 % for 
gasoline, 106 % for diesel, 119 % for kerosene and 7 % for LPG. There was no increase in the 
price of diesel fuel, which is mainly used for the generation of electricity. The initial relative 
success of fuel price adjustments was partially offset by an increase in commodity prices 
in later years. Accordingly, the subsidy bill stayed high at almost 9% of GDP in 2005. However, it 
is worth noting that the social tensions during this episode were linked not only to the reform of 
the subsidies, but also to the reform of the tax system. (Ostojic, 2013). 
As component of the reforms supported by the IMF's Extended Credit Facility in 2010, the 
prices of gasoline, diesel and kerosene were slowly increased by an average of around 30% 
and the price of LPG was doubled over a period of nine months. The reform strategy was 
centred on technical assistance from the World Bank, which managed to learn from the 
observation of previous reforms. Nevertheless, the public information campaign element of 
the strategy has not been introduced. Alternatively, the government has introduced small, 
surprising increases. In addition to the increase in fuel prices, the government has also 
implemented some efficiency-promoting measures, such as replacing diesel-powered generators 
with gas-fuelled ones. At the end of 2010, Yemen began to differentiate diesel prices by charging 
higher prices to commercial users. The primary objective of this reform instalment was to 
decrease fiscal pressures, following the record high fiscal deficit of 10% of GDP in 2009 (Ostojic, 
2013). 
In 2011/12, because of the political crisis and tight fiscal space, the government increased 
the price of gasoline by 66% and doubled the prices of diesel and kerosene. Overall, this 
reform episode was accepted by the population despite the political tension between the ruling 
party and the opposition. The major pipeline that provides oil to domestic refineries had been 
sabotaged. At the same time, the government was able to import only limited quantities of refined 
fuel products. The ensuing fuel scarcity resulted in the emergence of a black market, with prices 
that were a multiple of the official sale prices, and long lines at the gas stations. This situation 
may have played a role in the population’s acceptance of the official price increases in exchange 
for the benefit of uninterrupted supply (Ostojic, 2013). 
Social Programmes to Ease the Adverse Effects of Reforms 
In order to mitigate the impact of past subsidies reforms on the poor, the authorities have 
implemented or strengthened the following components of the social safety nets:   
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 The Social Welfare Fund was created as a poverty alleviation programme in 1996 
to offer conditional cash transfers to households. The Fund's coverage has been 
gradually extended and transfers have been increased in stages. Transfers were partly 
intended to mitigate the impact of fuel subsidies reforms. The timeliness of the 
implementation of measures concerning social support varied. For instance, in the 2005 
subsidy reform period, it took three years to approve the Social Protection Act to make it 
easier to apply for benefits and to increase monthly transfers. Conversely, the 2010 
reform was almost simultaneously alleviated by a 50% increase in the coverage of the 
cash transfer scheme. To date, there have been no mitigation measures in the 2011/12 
reform episode, but the government is planning a further boost in the coverage of the 
Social Welfare Fund or the size of existing transfers (Ostojic, 2013).    
 Apart from conditional cash transfers, Yemen has two other programmes 
concentrating mainly on poverty alleviation. The Public Works Project offers short-term 
employment and backing for small-scale contractors via a labour-intensive public works 
programme. Furthermore, the Social Fund for Development encourages community 
and small- and microenterprise- development and offers short-term employment for both 
the transitory and chronically poor. Other mitigating initiatives include change from more 
to less expensive fuels. For instance, the government encouraged the conversion from 
kerosene to LPG for residential use as from the beginning of the 2000s. In 2010, diesel-
fuelled power plants were also converted to natural gas (Ostojic, 2013).      
Lessons from Key Success Factors 
Cash transfers and other social protection programmes, if well designed and implemented 
in a timely manner, can be effective in protecting the poor and in reducing the resistance 
to reforms. The process of subsidy reform in Yemen has shown that adequate planning to 
strengthen the safety net and provide assurance on mitigation efforts is essential in order to win 
public support for the reform. Cash transfers from the Social Welfare Fund, as well as support 
from the Public Works Project and the Social Fund for Development, have helped to lower the 
opposition to reforms. On the basis of this experience, it can be argued that the dissent to the 
2005 reforms could have been lowered if the social protection programmes had been introduced 
simultaneously (Ostojic, 2013). 
Whereas adverse economic conditions raise the need for reforms, they may make price 
adjustments more complicated, especially if they are combined with political tensions. 
Therefore, it is essential, whenever possible, to incorporate reforms in a timely manner before 
economic and social conditions continue to worsen. The large resources used in generalised 
subsidies can then be used more effectively to target the poor and to stimulate growth and job 
creation (Ostojic, 2013). 
Experience with the pace and size of price hikes has varied. Yet, when the public was made 
aware about the need for and the advantages of the reforms (for instance, to ensure 
adequate supply) it supported a large price increase (Ostojic, 2013).2 
 
                                                   
2 When changes (such as price increases) were not followed by the implementation of an effective public 
information policy, especially in times of heightened political tension, widespread protests have forced the partial 
reversal of adjustments (Ostojic, 2013). 
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